EXPLANATORY TEXT OF

PLATE I.

THE FIRST IDEA OF MAN.

1.-The starting point of any sufficient development Spirit. of the Idea of Man, cannot be otherwise than that of the Idea of Spirit-the Spirit of Man which is in him'-but the Idea of Spirit moreover, as disentangled from its so intimate combination with that of Mind,-and when thus held apart, also further defined, as an Auto-nomic, or Self-moving, and Self-law-giving-Energy; for the most general Idea we have of Man, is that of his being a Selfmoving, and Self-law-giving-Energy; or of his turning upon the Spirit-Idea when defined as stated above, as upon a Primary or Principal axis, as imaged in the Plate.

Self-moving

"Plato takes his stand on the position, that the mere motion of The Idea of matter implies the existence of Spirit as an older and higher essence, or, Spirit as alone in other words, that Spirit alone is self-moving.....the term auto-kinesis, is not to be confined to local motion, but may refer to any change in the state or condition of a thing......In this sense volition is auto-kinesis, or self-motion, even although it never may be exhibited outwardly. That matter cannot possess this, in either acceptation of the term, is an affirmation rendered necessary by the very laws of mind. It is involved in the term itself, or rather in the idea of which the term is the real, and

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not merely arbitrary representative, and may therefore be called a logical necessity. Although the arguments may have something of the a posteriori form, it is nevertheless strictly a priori. It is a conclusion not derived from experience; for in truth, aside from the essential idea which the laws of our minds compel us to create, all our mere experience of matter is directly opposed to it. As presented to our senses, it seems to be ever in motion, and this phenomenon exhibits itself more constantly the more closely and minutely it is examined; so that, if experience alone were to be consulted, or, to use the language of some of our Baconians, if nature alone were to be interrogated, motion would appear to be the law, and rest (if absolute rest were ever to be discovered) the exception. Notwithstanding all this, the mind cannot divest itself of that idea (whether innate, or acquired, or suggested) which it hath of body, as distinguished from space, and whenever this idea is clearly called out, the soul doth affirm of necessity, and in spite of all the phenomena of experience to the contrary, that matter cannot move itself. The same necessity compels it, also, to declare that matter cannot continue motion by virtue of any inherent power, any more than it can commence it, and this, too, notwithstanding the opposing dogma so confidently laid down in all our books of natural philosophy. We have the constant observation of ten thousand motions, commenced and continued without the visible intervention of any spiritual agent, and, apparently, the result of innate properties, and, yet, when the mind remains sound and true to itself, all this does not at all weaken the innate conviction, that every kinesis implies the existence of an originating will or spirit somewhere, however many the impulsive forces that may seem to have intervened between that will and its ultimate object. When the mind is in a healthy state, we say it is compelled to affirm, and does affirm this, with the same confidence as the propositition that the three angles of every triangle are equal to two right angles, or that two bodies cannot occupy the same space. Even this,

notwithstanding it lies at the foundation of mechanical and dynamical physics, is ultimately to be resolved into a logical necessity; that is, a necessary affirmation into which the mind is driven by those laws of its own, that form not only our highest, but our only idea of truth. . . " -Tayler Lewis's (16th Excursus, p. 143,) " Plato against the Atheists."

"It may, perhaps, be objected, that Plato is resting these important The Spirit-Idea positions on mere words, to which he assigns his own arbitrary definias interpreted tions or notions. But what is meant by the sneering expression, mere a logical words, which is such a favourite with a certain class of modern declaimers? necessity of the mind. What are words-we speak not now of sounds or articulate enunciations, onomata or remata, but of the higher term logoi.-What are words in this sense, but outward expressions of the inward logical necessities of our own minds? And what can be higher proof for us than those affirmations, which the immutable laws of our own souls compel us to make, in respect to what is included or not included in a certain idea? Whatever belongs to the idea is necessary; so, on the other hand, whatever is necessary pertains to an idea, and the exclusion of any part involves, for our minds, a logical contradiction. The naming of them, therefore, cannot be arbitrary, except so far as the mere outward sound is concerned. There are certain ideas which are not dependent on language, as some of the nominalists of the School of Locke would hold, but language on them. So far, human speech may be regarded as something supernatural, although its outward dress or vocal forms may have been the result of conventional or accidental usage, instead of any natural adaptedness of sound to sense. We may give to the logos, or notion, any onoma we please. We may call it psyche, pneuma, ruach, nephesh, animus, anima, geist, or soul; we may etymologically associate this onoma with any such sensible phenomenon as we may fancy comes the nearest to the conception, such as air, breath, fire, æther, &c.; and in this

way the onoma may continually change; but the logos is not conventional. In all languages, even from the earliest periods, it has had a distinct vocal sign-as much so as that of body-and we expect, as a matter of course, to find it in every tongue we may investigate. The Idea which calls for the name is implanted by God as one of the fixed parts of our being. The metaphysical notion of soul is self-motion, self-energy, auto-kinesis. Of this notion we cannot divest ourselves. Hence, after proving, even from physical premises, that there must be somewhere self-motion, the mind attaches this logos to its onoma, and affirms that this self-motion is soul, psyche, geist, &c.,-being the same unchanging notion, whatever be the name-and that this name, although fixed to the flowing and varying sensible phenomenon from which it may have been etymologically derived-ultimately represents the immutable logos of which that sensible phenomenon is the symbol.-Tayler Lewis's (29th Excursus, p. 196). "Plato against the Atheists."

Soul-Affection and

2.-The Spirit, or Self-moving, and Self-law-givingBody-Sense Energy determined (par. 1) as the Primary or Principal Axis of the First Idea of Man, is now again shown to be the Spirit, or Self-moving, and Self-law-giving-Energy of Soul-Affection and Body-Sense ;-wherefore since the Idea of Soul-Affection is that of a Self-law-giving-Energy directed to the good of others, or of the Not-Self, and as so dependent upon that good, for the good of the Self, as to make of the Not-Self, One with the Self; whilst the Idea of the Body-Sense is that of the self-same Energy, as directed more immediately to the good of the Self, and