By some philosophers, the meaning of the word has been, of late, restricted still farther; to the power by which we distinguish truth from falsehood, and combine means for the accomplishment of our purposes;-the capacity of distinguishing right from wrong, being referred to a separate principle or faculty, to which different names have been assigned in different ethical theories. The following passage from Mr. Hume contains one of the most explicit statements of this limitation which I can recollect: "Thus, the distinct boundaries and offices of reason and of taste are easily ascertained. The former conveys the knowledge of truth and falsehood; the latter gives the sentiment of beauty and deformity,-vice and virtue. Reason, being cool and disengaged, is no motive to action, and directs only the impulse received from appetite or inclination, by showing us the means of attaining happiness or avoiding misery. Taste, as it gives pleasure or pain, and thereby constitutes happiness or misery, becomes a motive to action, and is the first spring or impulse to desire and volition," * On the justness of this statement of Mr. Hume, I have no remarks to offer here; as my sole object in quoting it was to illustrate the different meanings annexed to the word reason by different writers. It will competent to appeal to the former, as affording a standard of right and wrong, not less than of speculative truth and falsehood; nor can there be a doubt that, when he speaks of truth as the object of natural reason, it was principally, if not wholly, moral truth, which he had in his view :-" Reason is natural revelation, whereby the eternal Father of Light, and fountain of all knowledge, communicates to mankind that portion of truth which he has laid within the reach of their natural faculties. Revelation is natural reason, enlarged by a new set of discoveries, communicated by God immediately, which reason vouches the truth of, by the testimony and proofs it gives that they come from God. So that he who takes away reason to make way for revelation, puts out the light of both, and does much the same, as if he would persuade a man to put out his eyes, the better to receive the remote light of an invisible star by a telescope."-Locke's Essay, B. iv. c. 19. A passage still more explicit for my present purpose, occurs in the pleasing and philosophical conjectures of Huygens, concerning the planetary worlds. "Positis vero ejusmodi planetarum incolis ratione utentibus, quæri adhuc potest, anne idem illic, atque apud nos, sit hoc quod rationem vocamus. Quod quidem dicendum videtur, neque aliter fieri posse; sive usum rationis in hi quæ ad mores et æquitatem pertinent, sive in iis quæ spectant ad pri menta scientiarum. Etenim ratio apud nos est, quæ sensum justiti clementiæ, gratitudinis ingenerat, mala ac bona in universum din que ad hæc animum disciplinæ, multorumque invent -Hugenii Opera Varia, Vol. II. p. 663. Lugd. * Essays and Treatises, &c. Appendix, conca appear afterwards, that, in consequence of this circumstance, some controversies, which have been keenly agitated about the principles of morals, resolve entirely into verbal disputes; or, at most, into questions of arrangement and classification, of little comparative moment to the points at issue. Another ambiguity in the word reason it is of still greater consequence to point out at present; an ambiguity which leads us to confound our rational powers in general, with that particular branch of them, known among logicians by the name of the Discursive faculty. The affinity between the words reason and reasoning sufficiently accounts for this inaccuracy in common and popular language; although it cannot fail to appear obvious, on the slightest reflection, that in strict propriety, reasoning only expresses one of the various functions or operations of reason; and that an extraordinary capacity for the former by no means affords a test by which the other constituent elements of the latter may be measured. Nor is it to common and popular language that this inaccuracy is confined. It has extended itself to the systems of some of our most acute philosophers, and has, in various instances produced an apparent diversity of opinion where there was little or none in reality. "No hypothesis," says Dr. Campbell, "hitherto invented, hath shown that, by means of the discursive faculty, without the aid of any other mental power, we could ever obtain a notion of either the beautiful or the good." 66 * In confirmation of this remark, I shall only quote at present a few sentences from an excellent discourse, by Dr. Adams of Oxford, on the nature and obligations of virtue. Nothing can bring us under an obligation to do what appears to our moral judgment wrong. It may be supposed our interest to do this; but it cannot be supposed our duty.-Power may compel, interest may bribe, pleasure may persuade; but REASON only can oblige. This is the only authority which rational beings can own, and to which they owe obedience." It must appear perfectly obvious to every reader, that the apparent difference of opinion between this writer and Mr. Hume, turns chiefly on the different degrees of latitude with which they have used the word reason. Of the two, there cannot be a doubt that Dr. Adams has adhered by far the most faithfully, not only to its acceptation in the works of our best English authors, but to the acceptation of the corresponding term in the ancient languages. "Est quidem vera lex, recta ratioquæ vocet ad officium, jubendo; vetando, a fraude deterreat," &c. &c. "The two most different things in the world, says Locke, are, a logical chicaner, and a man of reason."-Conduct of the Understanding, § 3. Philosophy of Rhetoric, Vol. I. p. 204. The remark is undoubtedly true, and may be applied to all those systems which ascribe to reason the origin of our moral ideas, if the expressions reason and discursive faculty be used as synonymous. But it was assuredly not in this restricted acceptation, that the word reason was understood by those ethical writers at whose doctrines this criticism seems to have been pointed by the ingenious author. That the discursive faculty alone is sufficient to account for the origin of our moral ideas, I do not know that any theorist, ancient or modern, has yet ventured to assert. Various other philosophical disputes might be mentioned, which would be at once brought to a conclusion, if this distinction between reason and the power of reasoning were steadily kept in view.* In the use which I make of the word reason, in the title of the following disquisitions, I employ it in a man 66 * It is curious, that Dr. Johnson has assigned to this very limited, and (according to present usage) very doubtful interpretation of the word reason, the first place in his enumeration of its various meanings, as if he had thought it the sense in which it is most properly and correctly employed. Reason," he tells us, "is the power by which man deduces one proposition from another, or proceeds from premises to consequences." The authority which he has quoted for this definition is still more curious, being manifestly altogether inapplicable to his purpose. "Reason is the director of man's will, discovering in action what is good; for the laws of well-doing are the dictates of right reason."-Hooker. In the sixth article of the same enumeration, he states as a distinct meaning of the same word, ratiocination, discursive power. What possible difference could he conceive between this signification and that above quoted? The authority, however, which he produces for this last explanation, is worth transcribing. It is a passage from Sir John Davis, where that fanciful writer states a distinction between reason and understanding: to which he seems to have been led by a conceit founded on their respective etymologies. "When she rates things, and moves from ground to ground, But when by Reason she the truth hath found, And standeth fixt, she Understanding is." The adjective reasonable, as employed in our language, is not liable to the same ambiguity with the substantive from which is derived. It denotes a character in which reason (taking that word in its largest acceptation) possesses a decided ascendant over the temper and the passions; and implies no particular propensity to a display of the discursive power, if, indeed, it does not exclude the idea of such a propensity. In the following stanza, Pope certainly had no view to the logical talents of the lady whom he celebrates : "I know a thing that 's most uncommon, (Envy be silent and attend) I know a reasonable woman, Handsome and witty, yet a friend." Of this reasonable woman, we may venture to conjecture, with some confidence, that she did not belong to the class of those femmes raisonneuses, so happily described by Moliere: ner to which no philosopher can object-to denote merely the power by which we distinguish truth from falsehood, and combine means for the attainment of our ends omitting for the present all consideration of that function which many have ascribed to it, of distinguishing right from wrong: without, however, presuming to call in question the accuracy of those by whom the term has been thus explained. Under the title of Reason, I shall consider also whatever faculties and operations appear to be more immediately and essentially connected with the discovery of truth, or the attainment of the objects of our pursuit, more particularly the Power of Reasoning or Deduction; but distinguishing, as carefully as I can, our capacity of carrying on this logical process, from those more comprehensive powers which Reason is understood to imply. The latitude with which this word has been so universally used, seemed to recommend it as a convenient one for a general title, of which the object is rather comprehension than precision. In the discussion of particular questions, I shall avoid the employment of it as far as I am able; and shall endeavour to select other modes of speaking, more exclusively significant of the ideas which I wish to convey.* *Mr. Locke too has prefixed the same title, Of Reason, to the 17th chapter of his Fourth Book, using the word in a sense nearly coinciding with that very extensive one which I wish my readers to annex to it here. After observing, that by reason he means "that faculty whereby man is supposed to be distinguished from brutes, and wherein it is evident he much surpasses them; he adds, that " we may in reason consider these four degrees;-the first and highest is the discovering and finding out of proofs; the second, the regular and methodical disposition of them, and laying them in a clear and fit order, to make their connexion and force be plainly and easily perceived; the third is the perceiving their connexion; and the fourth is making a right conclusion." Dr. Reid's authority for this use of the word is equally explicit: "The power of reasoning is very nearly allied to that of judging. We include both under the name of reason."-Intellect. Powers, p. 671, 4to edit. Another authority to the same purpose is furnished by Milton: I presume that Milton, who was a logician as well as a poet, means by the words her being, her essential or characteristical endowment. To these quotations I shall only add a sentence from a very judicious French writer; which I am tempted to introduce here, less on account of the sanction which it gives to my own phraseology, than of the importance of the truth which it conveys. "Reason is commonly employed as an instrument to acquire the sciences; whereas, on the contrary, the sciences ought to be made use of as an instrument to give reason its perfection." L'Art de Penser, translated by Ozell, p. 2. London, 1717. Another instance of the vagueness and indistinctness of the common language of logicians, in treating of this part of the Philosophy of the Human Mind, occurs in the word understanding. In its popular sense it seems to be very nearly synonymous with reason, when that word is used most comprehensively; and is seldom or never applied to any of our faculties, but such as are immediately subservient to the investigation of truth, or to the regulation of our conduct. In this sense, it is so far from being understood to comprehend the powers of Imagination, Fancy, and Wit, that it is often stated in direct opposition to them; as in the common maxim, that a sound understanding and a warm imagination are seldom united in the same person. But philosophers, without rejecting this use of the word, very generally employ it, with far greater latitude, to comprehend all the powers which I have enumerated under the title of intellectual; referring to it Imagination, Memory, and Perception, as well as the faculties to which it is appropriated in popular discourse, and which it seems indeed most properly to denote. It is in this manner that it is used by Mr. Locke in his celebrated Essay: and by all the logicians who follow the common division of our mental powers into those of the Understanding and those of the Will. In mentioning this ambiguity, I do not mean to cavil at the phraseology of the writers from whom it has derived its origin, but only to point it out as a circumstance which may deserve attention in some of our future disquisitions. The division of our powers which has led to so extraordinary an extension of the usual meaning of language, has an obvious foundation in the constitution of our nature, and furnishes an arrangement which seems indispensable for an accurate examination of the subject nor was it unnatural to bestow on those faculties, which are all subservient in one way or another to the right exercise of the Understanding, the name of that power, from their relation to which their chief value arises. As the word understanding, however, is one of those which occur very frequently in philosophical arguments, |