AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.-II.

IN entering upon any controversy it is very every lover of his country to inquire into the desirable for each disputant not only to avoid mode in which it would probably manifest all extraneous considerations, but also to itself—what points are most likely to be first state as clearly as possible the exact nature attacked? No wise man spends his time in of the propositions which he intends to endeavouring to settle the probability of any maintain. So great is the imperfection of given misfortune befalling him, yet no human language, that it is scarcely possible thoughtful person omits to consider in what to put a topic of debate into the form of a manner and from what source such a missimple question without using a generality fortune may arise. We do not speculate on of expression seriously endangering the in- the probability of a burglar's visit to our terests of truth.* In the question before us homes. We know that he may come, and some difficulty arises from the excessive we simply consider how he would probably vagueness and latitude of meaning which attempt to get in, and take the necessary attaches to the word "probable." For my precautions to prevent his entrance. In acown part, mathematical recollections lead me cordance, therefore, with these considerations, always to think of "probability" as a variable I shall endeavour, first, to prove that an fraction, lying between 0 and 1; and I can- attempted invasion of this country by France not but regret that the phrase as to the ex- is highly probable, in case of a war between pediency of the "governmental precautions" the two countries; and, secondly, to show has been struck out of the question, since I that there are serious grounds for the ap think it might have afforded a sort of mea-prehension that a war may suddenly break sure of probability, instead of leaving it, as out. as present, to the varying tastes of individual disputants.

Upon a careful consideration of the subjectmatter of the present debate, I can scarcely think that it is intended to open these pages to a series of articles on the purely speculative question, "Will a war with France probably occur?" Such a question would, in my humble opinion, be wholly useless, since we know that it is neither within the province nor power of reason to draw back the veil of futurity; and, consequently, the formal discussion of this point would only sink those who engage therein from the noble position of truth-seeking controversialists into what my opponent, "Rolla," has aptly termed "grandiloquent prophets." Admitting, however, that a war may take place, it becomes a question of the deepest interest to

Perhaps I may be allowed, in illustration of my remarks, to refer to a late debate in these pages (that on the Sabbath question, see p. 133), where a writer claims "a unanimous verdict" on

the very illogical ground that his opponents have not maintained an unqualified affirmative! Now, since truth, like safety, is generally to be found lying between the two extremes of unqualified affirmation and negation, I hope that each writer in the present debate will be content to support his own views, or to oppose his autagonists', without requiring them to vote black or white, as demanded by the writer to whom we have just alluded.

I. When war is resolved upon, the first question which occupies the governments of the concluding nations naturally and necessarily is, "Where shall we commence hostilities?" To this question the natural answer is, "In the heart of the enemy's country, where every blow will tell, and where the expense and burden of our armies will, in a great measure, be transferred to our opponents." This plan is essentially the Gallic mode of procedure. To make the war support itself, to subsist and pay his troops by plunder, were the avowed maxims and actual practice of Napoleon. It must at first strike every one with surprise that France, after the protracted struggles of the last and present centuries, should exhibit a national debt so vastly inferior in amount to that of England; but when we turn to the records of history the cause of this discrepancy is at subsidized our allies, and fought on friendly once explained. We paid our own troops, or neutral ground, where everything was to be bought and paid for; while Napoleon marched on from victory to victory, conquered nations, and subdued half Europe, at a virtual cost of life only. Blinded by military glory, France was willing to send forth army after army to be destroyed beneath the imperial standards. Life was almost the

only treasure she spent-the only treasure cessful invasion on the part of the banished (we believe) which she would have consented Duke of Hereford, afterwards Henry IV. to spend in so profuse a manner! Twice Scarcely had Edward IV. established himself was England threatened with invasion, to be on the throne than Margaret of Anjou, asconducted by Napoleon himself; and, had hesisted with troops and money by Louis XI. not been inextricably entangled in continental quarrels, that threat would not have been in vain. Are we to suppose, then, that France will forget her ancient policy-that her army will despise the maxims and example of their idolized chief-that the new-fledged Emperor will, in this one item, refuse to copy his chosen model?

of France, landed once more to renew the wars of the Roses. Even Spain ventured to attempt an invasion, in despite of the courage of Elizabeth; and of its result we can only say, with her, "Afflavit Deus et dissipantur enimici." Not two hundred years since the Dutch insulted us in the Channel, and burned our ships of war at Chatham. William III. owed his crown to successful invasion; and the ex-King James was landed in Ireland by one French fleet, while another brought him 3,000 men, engaged an English fleet, captured seven Dutch vessels, and returned to Brest in twelve days. Need we refer to the attempted invasions of 1708, 1715, 1744, &c., in behalf of the Pretender, or to the elaborate plans formed by the celebrated Choiseul during the "seven years' war"? In 1796 a fleet was prepared at Brest, and actually sailed for Ireland, during the progress of negotiations, and five days before our ambassador was dismissed from Paris. In July, 1797, we were again treating for peace; but in October "The army of England" was formed on the French coast, and waiting for General Bonaparte, to whom the command was assigned. In 1798 the French troops landed in Ireland, and held Castlebar for some time. Lastly, we were threatened by the gigantic plan commenced at Boulogne. Two thousand three hundred and sixty-five vessels were crowded into the harbours of Boulogne, to transport to these shores a force outnumbering the whole British army at home and abroad; they arrived at that port in detachments, eluding the utmost vigilance of the English fleet on their passage, and defying the most desperate attempts to destroy them when assembled What can be done in the way of invasion is shown by the invasion of Holland in 1799, the bombardments of Copenhagen in 1801 and 1807, the expedition to the Scheldt in 1809, the capture of Washington in 1814, &c.

I now turn to the evidence of history. The first appearance of our beloved country on the stage of recognised history is connected with invasion by the Roman armies, and from the coasts of France. Again and again was invasion successful, until Britain became a conquered province of the Roman empire. A few centuries after the dominion of England passed into the hands of Saxon invaders, and they in their turn were invaded, harassed, and conquered by the Danes. Scarcely had these various nations begun to coalesce, than the Normans invaded the country and established their power; and at the present day our beloved Sovereign signifies her assent to acts of parliament in the Norman French of her invading ancestor, William I. From the date of the Conquest the reciprocal history of England and France, for some centuries, is little else than an interminable record of invasion and counter-invasion. May we specify a few instances. In 1209 we find that no less than 1,700 vessels were assembled at Boulogne, and the invasion was only bought off by one of the most disgraceful of all possible means-by bribing the Pope to forbid it. In 1216 Prince Louis, son of Philip II. of France, landed at Sandwich, took Rochester, and ravaged the country almost at will, failing only in his sieges of Dover and Windsor Castles; so that England seemed doomed to become a mere appanage of the French crown, until a defeat, suffered under the walls of Lincoln, compelled the invaders to evacuate the country in the summer of 1217. In 1293 Dover was burnt, and Kent laid waste, by French troops. In Such are the premises which history 1369 Southampton was plundered; and a affords us of judging of the probability of few years previously Brighton, Hastings, invasion. Let the reader decide. Perhaps, Plymouth, Portsmouth, and the Isle of Wight, however, some may object that the above were pillaged. In 1457 Sandwich was sacked. remarks would apply almost as well in supRichard II. lost his crown and life by a suc-porting the probability of the invasion of

£20,000 down on the spot on the memorable 2nd of December, 1851; this disreputable gambler is now marshal of France, senator of the empire, and minister of war! As a worthy "brother" in iniquity and immorality, the spendthrift traitor, Magnan, has been likewise dubbed marshal and senator, and elevated to the post of commander-inchief of Paris. Goodly specimens these! M. de la Guérouniére, the paid scribe of the Emperor, informs us that the "President" broke his oath to the constitution because

France by England. I reply, first, that the body of the English people would not consent to an aggressive war with France, and without their consent neither the court nor parliament could engage in war; in France the people have not the power to choose for themselves. Second, the English are not so sensitive of national honour as the French, and have no rankling recollections of humiliated pride. Third, England is more liable to injury from invasion than France. Paris is not situate on a highway of nations, like London; nor, like the latter, within two days' march of the coast: Cherbourg is declared impregnable-a proposition which cannot be predicated of any English port. The sack of Dunkirk would not compensate for the pillage of Southampton, nor the cap-"star" lead him to invade England? Conture of Dieppe for the bombardment of Liverpool.

II. I hope I have succeeded in satisfying the reader that an attempt to invade this country would most probably occur in the event of a war with France; I shall now proceed to point out some serious grounds for apprehending that war may speedily and suddenly come to pass. I believe the present feeling of the bulk of the French nation is in favour of peace; but when we consider the utter flickleness and headlong enthusiasm of their national character, the hopes which this belief would inspire quickly vanish. They seem to regard politics as a kind of national theatricals. The more frequently the scenes are shifted, the more novel and outrageous the feats performed, the warmer their applause. They will exult round the scaffold of a king, or pray round the bones of a despotic emperor, with equal fervour. They once adopted atheism, they now prop papacy on its throne. I turn, then, to consider the imperial actor, who now "fills his brief hour" upon the stage where their united suffrages have placed him. On him depends the question of peace or war; while his hour lasts they will follow his lead, and applaud his acts.

Is the character of the present Emperor such, then, as can inspire confidence? May we judge him by the company he keeps? There is General St. Armand, who was twice expelled from the army, who acted under an assumed name at a petty theatre in Paris, who has repeatedly been imprisoned for debt, and who is said to have received

his conscience liberated him, and his mission irresistibly hurried him on;" that "to obey his destiny, to follow his star, are the dictates of his duty." And again, that “his star led him to Boulogne." May not his

science cannot withhold him, for it sanctions midnight perjury. Common sense, selfinterest, reason, cannot dissuade the maniac who attempted to overthrow the monarchy of France by the ridiculous attempts at Strasburg and Boulogne. Hitherto we have seen that he almost always acts in direct opposition to his words. He swore to the constitution, and overthrew it at midnight; he sought a royal alliance, and married a plebeian! He derives his title by descent, and terms himself a "parvenu." And he (the man who in one night incarcerated a refractory parliament and deluged the streets of Paris with blood) had the audacity to tell the ignoble deputation of London citizens that he admired English liberty! Can any one trust this perjured hypocrite, when he professes to desire a lasting peace with England? Can we even hope that in this one case, he will forget his star, deny his mission, cast aside his model, and fashion his acts in accordance with his words? "True it is that England has everything to fear from the Emperor," is the ingenuous admission of our opponent " Rolla "!

Both friends and foes represent Louis Napoleon as a blind believer in fate. If this representation be correct, we may dispense with the consideration of his position; but since "Rolla" has based all his reasoning a the assumption that Louis Napoleon will act (like the majority of human beings) with a due regard to the circumstances in which be is placed, I feel bound to examine this topic. Now, are we to suppose that France will passively bear the yoke laid upon her by his

are told that they are "in exile;" that they "have retired" to "work unseen," and to find homes and kingdoms "in the heart of the nation;" and, lastly, that they are not "to be found" surrounding the Emperor!

The arguments to be drawn from considering the emperor's position with regard to the people, I have already endeavoured to prove to be in favour of my own side of the question. When the bulk of the nation are resolved on his downfall, they will doubtless find means to accomplish it; but let no one flatter himself that they will do this for our sake. It appears to me perfectly outrageous to suppose that those who acquiesced in the coup d'état, which deprived them of their own liberties, would rise in rebellion against an invasion of our rights.

Imperial Majesty Napoleon III.?-that the most restless and revolutionary nation on earth will quietly submit to the most uncontrolled despotism? He has deluded, deceived, and oppressed the people; cajoled the clergy; bribed the army; tabooed the press of France; Is this incoherent talk intended as reasontied the tongue of her orators; curtailed evening? the amusements of the people. He governs the nation by decree, the communes by police, and Paris by soldiery. He gambles with the national credit, and regulates the money market by edicts. His throne stands alone; raised by treachery, surrounded by hatred, and planted on a volcano. Thus far, he has pleased the bulk of the people by infantile shows, by reviews in the Champ de Mars, waterworks at Versailles, fêtes at the Tuileries, balls and banquets in the provinces. There yet remains the coronation and the pomp of empire; but when that is passed, he must tax his ingenuity for new means of diverting popular attention. Dare he remain at peace, and give France time to consider her position? According to Mr. Cobden, we went to war with France, in 1793, to'stave off political reform; and if that be the case, the move postponed reform for nearly forty years! Will Louis Napoleon hesitate to repeat the successful manœuvre which Mr. Cobden has so elaborately and kindly explained for his benefit? He has played a desperate game. He staked his all on the success of the coup d'état, and won; he has one more stake left, and that is war. Why should he hesitate? The example of his great predecessor points the way; if success fail him, the result cannot be worse than the fate of his chosen exemplar.

Let me now turn to examine the opposing arguments of "Rolla" on this head. The first argument is, that the Emperor "has not the sympathy of the great men of France." Now, may we ask whether "the great men of France" are so very pugnacious, that their absence will tend to keep the peace? Would Lamartine be likely to recommend war,-or Cavaignac to propose a treacherous attempt on our shores? It is amusing to read this part of "Rolla's" article. In one place we find that the Emperor dared to "trample on the genius of the nation"-in another place, that this ill-used genius "stands aloof" and "works unseen in the heart of the fallen nation." We are asked, "Where are the leading and noble characters" of France? and

"Rolla's" remarks on the relations of the present Emperor to the army and the priests are strange indeed. Napoleon Bonaparte has nothing to do with the question, any more than Lord Byron's poetry and the Polish officer who are dragged into the discussion to prove what I presume no one ever ventured to deny the attachment of the French army to the person of their great chief. Then we find that the present Emperor is "the slave, the tool, and flatterer of his army"-that the army "only obeys when it is to obtain its own ends;" and yet we read of "the base system of intimidation to which the army was subject"! Can any one construct an argument out of these flat contradictions? As to the priests, we are summarily informed that any power gained from them "would forsake" and "must ruin❞— a line of argument convenient to the writer, but scarcely convincing to the reader.

Lastly," says "Rolla," "though the Emperor would not regard the cause of liberty, his people would"! What can one make of this paradoxical idea, that the people who submit to the tyranny of "a dependent and powerless despot" would not permit of any infringement of English liberty? In what way does oratory addressed to a British audience on the threatened invas on by Napoleon I." disprove the probability of an invasion by Napoleon III.? What does the concluding poetry prove? I venture to suggest an improved reading, which I conceive will approach much nearer the truth—

Social Economy.

IS THE USE OF OATHS FOR CIVIL PURPOSES RIGHT AND EXPEDIENT?

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.-II.