and union. But Great Britain not being confidered as a continental power, other states did not think themfelves fo much interested with respect to the prefent attack made upon her, or fo liable to be affected by its confequences, as if it had been made upon their more immediate neighbours. The conteft was likewife, in its origin, merely colonial and domeftic; its objects were in another quarter of the world; and even ftill, the operations of the war being either naval, or conducted at a vast distance, did not much disturb the internal peace of Europe, nor were the confequences confidered as affect ing the general balance of power.

Our being left alone to encounter the vaft fuperiority of the ene my, was not then to be imputed to any fault or neglect on the fide of the councils or minifters of the throne, but to the miftaken opinion and erroneous policy of other ftates; who had, from thence, blindly permitted the united houfe of Bourbon, to bring their whole force, unmolefted and undisturbed, to bear upon this country. This was a mischief, which was as little to be forefeen as prevented by the minifters of Great Britain. They could not be accountable for the conduct of other ftates. It was not, however, to be doubted, that other powers would fpeedily perceive and rectify their error; and that, with a proper attention to their true intereft, as well as to the general fyftem of Europe, they would interpofe to check the ambition of the houfe of Bourbon.

The fame argument applied with equal effect to that charge, on which all the eloquence of grief, and all the indignation of appa

rent paffion, had been exhausted on the other fide; that of our naval inferiority, particularly on the narrow feas. It was impoffible for Great Britain alone, to oppose an equal number of fhips to the whole united force of the houfe of Bourbon; but if the even equalled or exceeded them in point of number, ftill the wide arrangement of her naval fervices, which was indifpenfably neceffary for the protection of her numerous, expofed, and remote dependencies, muft at any rate, notwithstanding any skill or judgment in the difpofition, afford an opportunity to the enemy of obtaining a fuperiority in fome particular part. Yet with that vaft fuperiority which they actually poffeffed in the preceding fummer, it would be found, on due confideration, that the difgrace was on their fide, and not on ours. They had fitted out a great and formidable armament; and it was true, that they had appeared upon our coafts; they talked big, threatened a great deal, did nothing, and retired.

Two things were to be particularly remembered, that the enemy were avowedly acting on the offenfive, and we as profeffedly on the defenfive. They came with a declared intention to invade us, we undertook to defeat the defign; they were therefore foiled; for they had not dared, even to make the attempt. Their immenfe armaments paraded, and paraded to no purpose; and their millions were spent in vain. Had they landed, (and it were almost to be wifhed they had) their reception would have been fuch, as would not only have added to their dif grace, but would have afforded

them

to crown the hiftory of their campaign.

It was denied, that the retreat of the British fleet, under Sir Charles Hardy, up the channel, could with any propriety be confidered as a flight. The whole conduct of that admiral, demanded no less the admiration than the applause of his country. To decline an engagement, when he expected a reinforcement, and when the enemy were fo vaftly fuperior in number, was the effect of prudence, and eminent profeffional kill; to have accepted a challenge, would have been the madnefs of valour. It was not, however, in any degree a flight; he endeavoured, by feveral judicious motions, to have drawn the enemy up the channel, where, from its narrowness, and other circumftances, our fleet might have engaged them with lefs difadvantage, and they might have been fubjected to much danger. The enemy did not chuse to venture far up the channel; but the defign was the refult of prudence and fuperior judgment. It was indeed true, that if the commander could then have poffibly known the internal ftate and ill condition of the enemy's fleet, he would have eagerly fought an engagement, inftead of avoiding it; but as the knowledge was unattainable, he could not profit of the occafion.

It was invidious, they faid, on the other fide, to endeavour to deprive minifters and commanders of their due merits, in the protection of our trade, and in baffling all the defigns of the enemy, by afcribing folely to providence, thefe happy and important circumstances. VOL. XXIII,

acknowledge, that it required great fagacity, and no common abilities, with no more than from thirty-feven to forty fhips of the line, to amufe, fix the attention, and keep in continual motion for fo long a time, without their being able to gain any advantage, the vaftly fuperior fleets of the enemy, which counted no less than fixtyfix fhips of the fame rank and cha racter. This judicious conduct produced the muft talutary effects. An immenfe hoftile armament was kept together during the campaign, and its efforts directed to a point. where they could be of no avail; whereas, had this vaft force been employed upon separate services, and directed to specific operations in the western world, or, perhaps, other parts, befides the deftruction of our commerce, which muft have been inevitable, we should probably, by this time, have been difrobed of fome of our most valuable poffeffions.

The minifter acknowledged, that it would have been a matter of no fmall moment, to have prevented the junction of the French and Spanish fleets; he likewife acknowledged, that we were much more forward in point of naval preparation than France; but he had every reason to believe, that it was not in our power to prevent the junction. The measure was in contemplation; and had the French continued in port, until they were in real condition for fervice, the junction would have been most affuredly prevented; but they perceiving our intention, rather chose to flip out of Breft, as they were, while we were ftill preparing, than to wait for proper equipment at [D]

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the rifque of an encounter. If it was afked, why we were more nice with respect to preparation than France, the answer was obvious; we had another enemy to attend to; the naval force of Spain was in full equipment; our all depended on our fleet; we were therefore of neceffity cautious.

With refpect to Plymouth, the charge was partly denied, its force weakened, by alledging the conviction of government that no debarkation was there intended by the enemy, and the attention was called off from the paft to the prefent ftate of that place, by ftating the effectual meafures which had been fince taken for its fecurity.

As to Ireland, the minifter obferved, that if it was diftreffed, and he heard it was, it was certainly entitled to relief. England would undoubtedly grant her every thing that could be given without injuring herself, and Ireland could not, with juftice, ask more. Ireland could bear no refentment to the prefent adminiftration, for fhe had received more favours and national benefits from them, than from any other during the forty preceding years. Her complaints were not directed against the prefent fervants of the crown; they were laid against the conftitution of this country; for the great fource of their complaints lay in thofe laws, which were paft during the reign of Charles the fecond and William the third, impofing reftraints upon their trade. He did not believe in their diftrefs; and as he did not know the evil, he was not able to point out a fpecific remedy. But whenever her griev ances appeared, he was well difpofed to redress them. Ireland,

fo far as his voice went, fhould have what was reasonable; and he was fo well convinced that the would be satisfied, that he did not entertain the malleft apprehenfion on that fubject.

He concluded, upon the whole, that our situation was not by any means fo lamentable as it had been defcribed; that it was much more fecure and refpectable at prefent, than it had been at the same season of the preceding year; our fleet was much stronger, and likely to be foon confiderably augmented; though he would not encourage too fanguine expectations, he entertained ftrong hopes that the enfuing fpring would open a brilliant campaign; and inftead of thofe fuppofed fymptoms of danger, which were faid to keep mankind at a diftance, we fhewed fuch a fulness of ftrength, and growing vigour of preparation, that power in Europe could hefitate, on that account, at making a common caufe with us.

no

He obferved, with regard to the propofed amendment, that the language it contained was ftrictly parliamentary. It was the duty, as well as the right of parliament, to cause the removal of evil minifters ; but juftice required, that proof fhould firit be made of their delinquency. To remove the fervants of the crown, without affigning any caufe for it; or attributing to them, without evidence or trial, thofe errors or crimes, which on trial would not be found imputable to them, would be equally unjust and unprecedented. Therefore, though he admitted, to the fullest extent, the right of that houfe to addrefs the throne for a removal of minifters; yet, as there

was

was nothing fpecifically charged against them in the amendment, he muft certainly oppofe it on principle; much less could it be fuppofed that he would agree to the implied cenfure upon himself, which was included in the general requifition for new counfels and new counfellors.

One of the ableft advocates on the fame fide obferved, that the addrefs was totally unexceptionable in all its parts; that it went no farther in its tendency than to carry up to the throne, thofe expreffions of duty and affection, which had ever been the language of parliament, in their anfwer to the fpeech of the fovereign. There was not a word in the addrefs. which could imply that parliament pledged itfelf to the fupport of any particular meafare, or to oppofe or protect any particular defcription of men. Along with the ufual terms of refpect, it contained nothing more than a general profeffion of union, on the common principle of felfdefence.

On the other hand, the amendment, according to the explanations which had been given in its fupport, implied a requifition, not only that his majefty would difmifs all his counfellors, whether guilty or guiltless, old or new; but that he would go ftill farther, and adopt an entirely new fyftem of government. On this he obferved, that the conflitution had placed the executive power of this government in the fovereign, the official functions of which are performed by perfons of his appointment, each of whom is perfonally refponfible for

his conduct in office. It was abfolutely neceffary, he faid, for preferving the due equilibrium prefcribed by the conftitution, that the prince fhould have free liberty to appoint thofe perfons to the various executive offices, who appeared to him the moft proper to fill them; otherwife the government would degenerate into an ariftocracy, and affume the worft vices, without the virtues, of a republic. If the prince were debarred of fuch a choice, either the nobles would acquire a moft dangerous afcendancy over crown, or the commons, encircling the throne, like a spider's web, with a miniftry of their own choofing, would throw every thing into anarchy and confufion, and reduce us to the worst and moft defpicable ftate of go

vernment.

the

Neither the courfe of reasoning, the arguments, or the afferticus of the minifter, were fufficient to afford any fatisfaction to the other fide. They obferved, that with his ufual ingenuity, he had converted the heaviest charges against his conduct, into the means of actual defence. The criminal neglect and fatal decline of the navy under his administration, illuftrated and proved by its acknowledged inferiority, and late indelible difgrace, afforded a charge of fo alarming and capital a nature, that it feemed to lay him under an indifpenfible neceffity of fhewing, either, that it had not declined, or that the grants afforded by parliament were not ad. equate to its fupport. But without the fmalleft trouble of that fort, the minifter applies that [D] z

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