250 men, with two fmall loaded prizes, were brought fafely off; but the country people, with fome troops and militia, now keeping up a conftant fire, with cannon and howitzers, as well as fmall arms from the fhore, they were obliged to be contented with burning, or otherwise destroying, two other ftout frigates, an armed cutter of 16 guns, with a number of small craft. The attempt upon Jersey appeared, however, to be only a prelude, or intended as a preparatory exercife, to that grand invafion of Great-Britain, Ireland, or both, which feemed at that time, and during the greater part of the fummer, to be in the immediate contemplation of France. Whether that defign was really adopt ed, was, with fome, a matter of doubt; but it was certainly strongly indicated by appearances; the northern provinces of France were every where in motion; as well on the coafts, as in the interior country. Armies were marched down to the fea coafts of Normandy and Brittany; the ports in the bay and on the channel, which were the best calculated for the purpose, were crowded with fhipping; and the king named the generals and principal officers, who were to command or to act in a grand intended expedition. The military power of England was not at that time fully called forth; and the defenceless state of Ireland in the beginning of the year might well have given birth to fuch a defign. Whatever the defigns of the enemy were, Great Britain feemed to have one great object of policy with respect to the direction and difpofi tion of her naval force in Europe. This was to prevent the junction of the French and Spanish fleets, by blocking the former up in the port of Breft, until the feafon of enterprize was over. Although this measure was undoubtedly in contemplation, yet, whether the naval preparation of Great Britain was not fo forward as was imagined and given out; or from whatever caufe, the fea was left open; and the French fleet at Breft was permitted to join the Spanish at Cadiz. This neglect, or neceffity, was the more felt, as it ferved in its confequences to govern all the enfuing naval events of the campaign; and to give a new caft and colour to the state of public affairs between the house of Bourbon and Great Britain. The murmur and diffatisfaction were likewife much increased, from a general report and opinion, not only that the French fleet was more backward in point of preparation and condition than the British, but that the latter had been dilatory in its motions after it had failed, as well as flack in its endeavours to prepare for failing. However thefe charges or opinions might have been founded, they could not but derive great ftrength from the fubfequent infult on our coafts, which appeared to be the direct confequence of that junction of the enemies united force. The French fleet, confifting of about 28 fail of the line, under the command of M. D'Orvilliers, failed from Breft early 4th. in the month of June, and by directing its courfe to the fouthward, indicated its deftination to the coaft of Spain. It has been fince faid, that it was very defec-. tive in point of preparation; but that it hurried to fea in that condition, from an apprehenfion of its being intercepted by the British fleet under Sir Charles Hardy, which was then daily expected in the Bay of Bifcay. It spent fome confiderable time on the Spanish coafts; and it was reported, that fome mifunderstanding, or difference, between fome of the commanders on both fides, prevented an enterprize of the atmoft importance from taking place. It would feem that this must allude to an attack upon Gibraltar, a defign which does not, however, feem very confiftent with their fubfequent conduct. It does not feem improbable that the delay proceeded from the defect of preparation on both fides. However that may be, the whole force being at length joined, the combined fleets made a tremendous appearance; amounting to between fixty and feventy line of battle fhips, befides a cloud of frigates, firefhips, and all thofe fmaller kinds and denominations of veffels which in any manner appertain to war. This formidable force, having turned its face to the northward, continued to direct its courfe to the coafts of Great Britain. It was rather fingular, that the British home fleet, under Sir Charles Hardy, amounting to about 35, or from thence to 38 fhips of the line, was then cruizing in fome part of the bay, or fomewhere near the chops of the channel, and was paffed by this great armament, which covered fo great an extent of ocean, with out their having any knowledge of each other. The enemy entered the British channel about the middle of Auguft, and paraded two or three days before Plymouth, to the great alarm of the people, but without making any attempt on the place. The Ardent man of war, of 64 guns, which was on her way from Portfmouth to join Sir Charles Hardy, . miftaking them from the British fleet, had, however, the misfortune of being taken in fight of Plymouth. Ă ftrong eafterly wind, which continued for feveral days, feems to have driven them out of the channel. They however pretended, that they went in fearch of the British fleet; and they continued to range about the Land's End, the Scilly Iflands, and the chops of the channel, until the end of the month. On the last of August, the wind being in his favour, Sir Charles Hardy gained the entrance of the channel, in fight of the combined fleets, without their being able to prevent him. The great object of that commander, was to draw them up to the narrow part of the channel, where, if he fhould be obliged to an engagement, he could engage upon lefs difadvantageous terms; and where, either a defeat, or certain changes of the wind, might have been productive of the most ruinous confequences to the enemy. The enemy pursued him as high up as Plymouth; but being fenfible of the danger, particularly at that season of the year, they did not adventure much farther. And as the combined fleets were now become fickly in the most extreme Vaft State of public affairs previous to the meeting of parliament, combination of power against Great Britain. Proclamations; for reprizals on Spain; and for defenfive measures in case of an invafion. Various manifeftos, and public pieces, iffued by the belligerant powers. Some obfervations on the charges exhibited by Spain. Oftenfible causes, and real motives for war, on the fide of the House of Bourbon. Ireland. Caufes which led to the present state of affairs in that kingdom. Commercial, and non-confumption agreements. French invafion threatened. Military affociations. People become ftrongly armed. Exemplary condnet of the affociators. Prudent meajures of government in that country. General demand of a free and unlimited commerce. Difcontents in Scotland, under an apprehenfion of a relaxation of the popery laws. Outrages in Edinburgh and Glasgow. Subjcriptions for raifing troops, and other public purposes. East India company grant bounties for raifing 6ooo feamen, and undertake to build three hips of the line, as an augmentation to the royal navy. State of parties. Changes in adminiftration. Meeting of the Irish parliament. ply fo with regard to the advanage of a naval ftation, and in point of honour, by the double defeat both by fea and land, which, with forces fo greatly unequal, D'Eftaing received from the gallantry and conduct of Admiral Barrington and General Meadows. At, the fame time, the advantages obtained in the Eaft Indies were of the firft importance; and the reduction of Georgia, opened the way for goading and wounding the Americans in their most tender and fenfible part, by that war which has been ever fince carried on in the fouthern colonies. In this year, the appearance of things was by no means fo favourable. The flags of our enemies, were now for the first time, or at leaft after a very long interval, feen flying triumphant in our feas, and their fleets braving the Britifh fhores with impunity. The mighty acceffion of the whole weight of the Spanish monarchy, to that dangerous confederacy which was already formed against us, could not but deeply fink a 'fcale, which, without that acceffion, was apparently to a level with our own. Such a combination of real power, and of actual effective force, has feldom been known in Europe upon any occafion, much less against any fingle ftate; excepting, perhaps, only that, which was lately united, but without any application of ftrength, in the partition of Poland. The great and formidable confederacy against the king of Pruffia in the late war, will not hold in this comparifon. For befides that he was ably fupported by a most potent ally, various impediments arofe in the way, which prevented the accumulation, and the actual exertion of feveral of the parts, of that vast force which was defined to his deftruction. The operations of one of the moft formidable of his enemies, were greatly impeded by distance, and itill more by internal circumstances. A fecond, not lefs dangerous, was, excepting a very short period, taken wholly off his hands by Great Britain. A third, was deprived of power by furprize; and a fourth, was ineffective by nature. Similar exceptions might be found with respect to the grand alliance formed against Lewis the XIV, at the opening of the prefent century; and it fhould be remembered that Spain, though it was, in fome refpects, rather a burthen, than an acceffion of force to that monarch, yet was more conveniently fituated for him than for his enemies; and that the treafures and commerce of the Indies were in a great measure in his hands during the war. It was not even against a state, fingle, but whole, that the prefent mighty combination of power was directed. It was against a ftate, already weakened by a ruinous civil war, and now difparted by defection; whilft the fevered parts operated against it in the duplicate ratio, of a privation of native firength, and a communication of actual force to the combination. The refiftance of Great Britain to that mighty combination, filled all thofe parts of Europe which looked on with aftonishment and refpect. At home, her refources feemed to grow with her necef was neceffities. In no part of the world was her naval or military glory obfcured, where it thought proper to exert, either her naval or her military power. The combined force of the enemy was incumbered with thofe difficulties which ever attend combined operations: and this was probably the cause of their lofs of feveral opportunities, the right ufe of which might have proved fatal to us. It was not, as in the war against Louis the fourteenth, in the power of the allies to bring on thofe great battles which decide the fate of em pires. The war was at fea; and the fea is a wide field. The naval mode of war is perhaps in its nature not fo decifive as that which is carried on by land. It was become every day more and more difficult to bring on a decifion by land. The alarm of the preceding time had caufed a great exertion in England, which, from a ftate very much unprepared, became at length to be powerfully armed. It must be obferved, however, that this ftand, which was made fometimes by bold pushes, and fometimes by prudent retreats, has had no tendency to bring the war to a termination. The heterogeneous parts of the alliance obtained time to coalefce. The great fubject of alarm to all thinking men was the regular progreffive growth of the enemy's naval force; and that not only in number of fhips, but alfo in naval kill. This had been too much overlooked in the beginning, from our confined attention to the American war. Against this no fufficient precaution feems to have been taken. VOL. XXIII. Whether afterwards it was in our power to recover our fuperiority, it is not easy to determine. Thus, we not only had to enCounter the antient fpirit and gallantry of our neighbour rivals, but likewife that artificial and dangerous courage, arifing from a confcioufnefs of profeffional knowledge and ability; and our feamen could not but be amazed, to fee fome of their own peculiar characteristics, with respect to maritime fkill and dexterity, as it were, fuddenly transferred to the enemy. The hoftile mani fefto prefented by the June 16th. Marquis D'Almodo 1779. var, the Spanish ambaffador, befides the recal of Lord Grantham from Madrid, drew out from the court of London, on the third day after it was prefented, a proclamation for reprizals on Spain, along with another, containing regulations for the diftribution of prizes taken during the continuance of hoftilities with that country. Thefe were followed, foon after the July 9th. rifing of parliament, by another. proclamation, which announced to the public the receiving intelligence of an intended invafion of this kingdom by our enemies; and which likewife iffued orders to the proper officers, for carefully watching the coafts; and, upon the first approach of the enemy, for the immediate reinoval of horfes, oxen, cattle, and provifions, to places of fecurity, and at a proper (but undefined) distance. Thefe were followed, at dre intervals, and according to all the eftablished rules of form, by [B] |