(2.) The kings and queens of England exercise authority in matters of faith, and are the ultimate judges of what is agreeable or repugnant to the word of God.

The act of supremacy says expressly that the king hath power to redress and amend all errors and heresies; to enjoin what doctrines are to be preached, and not repugnant to the laws of the land; and if any should preach contrary, he was for the third offence to be judged a heretic, and suffer death. The monarchs of England claimed and exercised the right to prohibit all preaching for a time; as did Henry VIII., Edward VI., Mary and Elizabeth. They sometimes limited the clergy's preaching to certain of the 39 articles established by law, as King Charles I. did. All the foregoing kings and queens published instructions or injunctions concerning matters of faith, without consent of the clergy in convocation assembled ; and enforced them on the clergy under the penalties of a premunire. This made it difficult to understand that clause of the 20th article of the church which says, "The church has authority in matters of faith."

Moreover, the articles of religion were not published at first by the convocation. They were prepared by a council of bishops and other learned men, under the direction and authority of Edward VI., and promulgated by him in June, 1553, and directed to the rectors of the universities and all the clergy for subscription. As Burnet declares, they were neither passed in convocation, nor so much as offered to it. It was only in after times, in the reign of Elizabeth, that they received the sanction of the convocation; and even then the queen had the principal hand in publishing them. Archbishop Cranmer and Bishop Ridley were appointed, by King Edward, to accomplish this work. They accordingly framed fortytwo articles upon the chief points of the Christian faith; copies of which were sent to the other bishops and learned divines, for their corrections and amendments; after which the archbishop reviewed them a second time, and having corrected them according to his best judgment, presented them to the council, where they also received the royal sanction, and were finally published by the king. This was another high, though legitimate act of the supremacy; for the articles were not brought into parliament, nor agreed upon in the convocation as they ought to have been, and as their title seems to express, and is as follows: "Articles agreed upon by the bishops and other learned men in the convocation held at London in the year 1552, for the avoiding diversities of opinions, and stablishing consent touching true religion. Published by the king's authority." These articles are for substance the same with those now in use, being reduced to the number of thirty-nine, in the beginning of the reign of Queen Elizabeth. The reader will meet with the corrections and alterations in Burnet. (Vol. ii, b. i, p. 219, col. 55.) The controverted clause in the 20th article, that the church has power to decree rites and ceremonies, and authority in matters of faith, is not in King Edward's articles, nor does it appear how it came into Elizabeth's. Indeed, it appears to be an interpolation. And as to the title of the articles, which states they were the work of the convocation, Bishop Burnet expressly declares that the convocation had nothing to do in the business. After discussing this point he

says: "These evidences make it plain that the articles of religion did not pass in convocation. We have Cranmer's own words for it, that he drew them, and that he, who was always plain and sincere, did not approve of that deceitful title that was prefixed to them to impose on the unwary vulgar." (Hist. Ref., vol. iii, p. 255.) That the articles were published by regal authority, we have ample proof from the mandate addressed to "the officers of the archbishop of Canterbury; requiring them to see that the article of religion should be subscribed." The same appears from "the king's mandate to the bishop of Norwich, sent with the articles to be subscribed by the clergy." In this last, the king required and exhorted the bishop to sign the articles, and in his preaching observe them, and to cause them to be subscribed by all others who do or shall preach." But we refer our readers to Burnet's History of the Reformation for these mandates. (Vol. iii, b. iv, p. 256; Collections No. vii, and viii.) On the whole, it is manifest that the articles of the English Church were not promulgated by the parliament or convocation of England; but were authoritatively published by Edward VI., and Queen Elizabeth; and that the convocation and clergy were compelled to receive these articles without having power to reject or amend them in any way. The kings and queens of England, then, have the sole authority in matters of faith vested in them by parliament; and the convocation and clergy have nothing to do but to submit; or to undergo the penalties of premunire as in former times, or turn dissenters, as in the later days.

As to the catechism of the Church of England, it was printed with a preface prefixed to it in King Edward's name, bearing date the 24th of May, about seven weeks before his death. It was drawn up by a pious and learned man, supposed to be Bishop Painet, and was given to be revised by some bishops and learned men ; and was published authoritatively by the king with instructions to all schoolmasters to teach it. (Idem. vol. iii, b. iv, p. 258.) The Book of Common Prayer was published by the same authority as were the Articles and Catechism, (Idem. vol. ii, b. i, pp. 222, 248,) with the addition of parliamentary authority. (For farther information on the articles &c. see Neal's History of the Puritans, vol. i, c. ii, p. 68; also Burnet, vol. ii, b. i, p. 219; vol. iii, b. iv, pp. 253–262.) (3.) The king regulates the discipline of the church.

As to the canon laws, by the statute (25 Henry VIII., c. xix, revised and confirmed by 1 Elizabeth, c. i,) it is declared that all canons not repugnant to the king's prerogative, nor to the laws, statutes, and customs of the realm, shall be used and executed. Canons enacted by the clergy, unless such as are already recognized by parliament, do not bind the laity, whatever regard the clergy may think fit to pay them. The clergy are bound by the canons or constitutions made by the king only; but they must be confirmed by the parliament, to bind the laity. The king is the supreme ordinary, and by the ancient laws of England, might, without act of parliament, make laws for the government of the clergy; and if there be a controversy between spiritual persons concerning jurisdiction, the king is arbitrator, and it is a right of his crown to declare the bounds. (Jacob's Law Dictionary on Canon Law Supre

macy.) The kings of England possess the power of the keys to no small extent. For though the old canon law be in force as far as is consistent with the laws of the land and the prerogatives of the crown; yet the king is the supreme and ultimate judge in the spiritual courts by his delegates, as he is in the courts of common law by his judges. His majesty might appoint a single person of the laity to be his vicar-general in all ecclesiastical causes to reform what was amiss, as King Henry VIII. and Charles I. did; which very much resembles the pope's legates in the times before the Reformation. By authority of parliament, the crown was empowered to appoint thirty-two commissioners, some of the laity, and some of the clergy, to reform the canon or ecclesiastical laws; and though the design was not executed, the power was certainly vested in the king, who might have ratified the new canons, and given them the force of a law, without consent of the clergy in convocation. Therefore, at the coronation of King Charles I. the bishop was directed to pray, that God would give him Peter's key of discipline and Paul's doctrine.

(4.) The English monarchs order the rites and ceremonies of the church.

The act of uniformity expressly says "That the queen's majesty, by the advice of her ecclesiastical commissioners, or of the metropolitan, may ordain such ceremonies or rites as may be most for the advancement of God's glory and the edifying of the church.” Accordingly her majesty published her injunctions without sending them into convocation, or parliament, and erected a court of High Commission for ecclesiastical causes, consisting of commissioners of her own nomination, to see them put into execution. And so jealous was Queen Elizabeth of this branch of her prerogative, that she would not suffer parliament to pass any bill for the amendment or alteration of the ceremonies of the church; it being, as she said, an invasion of her prerogative. (Neal, vol. i, pp. 122, 123.)

(5.) The British monarchs, in consequence of their prerogative, as head of the church, have the right of ordination, or the principal part in the appointment of bishops.

The kings and queens of England have sole right of nominating bishops; and the dean and chapter are obliged to choose those whom the kings name, under the penalty of premunire; and after they are chosen and consecrated, they might not act but by commission from the crown. (Blackstone, b. i, c. vii, p. 280.) A bishop or archbishop is elected by the chapter of his cathedral church by virtue of a license from the crown. When there is a vacancy, "the king may send the dean and chapter his usual license to proceed to election; which is always to be accompanied with a letter missive from the king, containing the name of the person whom he would have them elect." (Idem. b. i, c. xi.) Moreover "it is enacted by statute 25 Henry VIII., c. xx, that if the dean and chapter refuse to elect the person named by the king, or any archbishop or bishop refuse to confirm or consecrate him, they shall fall within the penalties of the statute of premunire. Also by statute 5 Elizabeth, c. i, to refuse the oath of supremacy will incur the pains of premunire." (Idem. b. iv, c. 8, p. 114.) These elections, so called, are properly no election at all; and though the writ issued by the

king is called congè d'elire, permission to elect, it is the mere shadow of election, and it might be properly called a compulsion to elect, which is a most absurd contradiction. For the permission to elect, where there is no power to reject, can never be reconciled with the freedom of an election. But the bishoprics of the new foundation, as well as those of Ireland, are all donative, so that there is no necessity to go through the useless round of a congè d' elire for the purpose of having them appointed. We may indeed justly say that the king appoints to office, seeing the course pursued leaves it in his power to appoint, or have appointed, whom he pleases.

And even in forming an ordinal for ordaining ministers and bishops, the parliament and king are the actors in this matter. For in a session held the 3d and 4th Edward IV., c. xii, an act was passed for a form for ordaining ministers, which declares, "That such forms of ordaining ministers as should be set forth by the advice of six prelates and six divines, to be named by the king, and authorized under the great seal, should be used after April next, and no other." (Neal, vol. i, p. 57.) Here the very form or mode of consecration is thrown out of the hands of the clergy, to whom, of right, this properly belongs.

When bishops were made by letters patent, which was before explained, bishops held their office only during the life of the king, as all bishops do during the king's good pleasure. It was the opinion of Cranmer that the exercise of the episcopal jurisdiction depended on the prince; and as he gave it he might restrain or take it away at his pleasure. Accordingly, at the death of Henry, he took out a new commission from Edward VI.

In short the English bishops not only receive their sees from the king, but they hold them, durante bene placito-during their good pleasure; privilegio regina-by privilege of the queen; vice nomine, et auctoritate nostris, in our room, name, and authority; vice regis, in the place of the king. It is true the mere ceremony of consecration, which is the smallest part of ordination, is performed by bishops; but do not the original choice, the special appointment, and the continuance in office, all of which depend on the king, go farther toward ordination than merely the outward rite?

Besides, the kings of England divided bishoprics as they pleased; they converted benefices from the institutions of their founders, and gave them to cloisters and monasteries, as King Edgar did. They also granted these houses exemption from episcopal jurisdiction; so Ina exempted Glastenbury, and Offa St. Albans from their bishops' visitation. And this continued till the days of William the Conqueror who gave to Battle Abbey the following grant, "That it shall be also free and quiet for ever from all subjection to bishops, or the dominion of any other persons, as Christ's church in Canterbury is." And these precedents were quoted and followed by Henry VIII., at the Reformation, (Burnet, vol. i, p. 198.) Thus the bishops usurped the power that originally belonged to the presbyters and people; the kings wrested from the hands of the bishops their usurped authority, and even added thereto; the pope nearly disfranchised both, kept all to himself, and gave back to the presbyters and people none of their original rights, though he inflicted on them many wrongs.

And finally Henry VIII., stripped violently from the triple crown both his temporal and spiritual power in England, and made and unmade bishops at pleasure, as all his successors have done to the present time. It is true, they allowed in the days of Henry VIII., that the bishop's pastoral care was of divine institution; but then they also strenuously maintained, and practised accordingly, "that their kings did always make laws about sacred matters, and that their power reached to that (the making, restraining, and unmaking bishops,) and to the persons of Churchmen as well as to their own subjects." Thus, though the bishop's office was allowed to be of divine right, the high and sacred office of kings was of divine right also: and consequently kings by divine right could constitute bishops." Thus they argued and overlooked the word of God.

ART. II. THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN FAITH AND KNOWLEDGE. THAT the human mind is restricted in its operations within certain boundaries, is indisputable. However profound our researches, however extensive the field of our observations, or nice and discriminating may be our minds, there are limits beyond which it is impossible to go. We seem, indeed, to be placed in a circle within which we are permitted to range at pleasure: but the moment we attempt to extend our researches beyond it, we are either forced back by an awful apprehension of danger, or, as a punishment for our temerity, are precipitated into an abyss of unfathomable mysteries, where the mind is tossed about in a whirlpool of tumultuous thoughts, which no human intellect can arrange or digest. Is it not owing to a temerity like this, that so many have speculated themselves into the empty dreams of skepticism, or fallen into the gloomy gulf of a heartless atheism? Overleaping the bounds which the Creator has set to human knowledge, they have heedlessly plunged into the depths of an atheistical philosophy, alike dishonouring to God and degrading to man. Is it not from the same cause that so many baseless hypotheses have arisen which have floated about in the intellectual world, and which "dazzle only to blind?" On the other hand, while we prudently keep within our destined sphere of observation, and content ourselves with a knowledge of those facts put within our reach by our Creator, at the same time that our intellect is improved, those things which are beyond the grasp of our comprehension will remain as objects of belief; this is the way of duty and of safety.

In the few remarks we have to make on the subject indicated at the head of this article, we shall be guided by the hints already suggested. But that we may not "speak to the air," we will in the first place, attempt a definition of the two words, Faith and Knowledge.

1. By Faith, we understand that exercise of the mind which embraces any proposition supported by competent testimony. We mean, moreover, those propositions which are not ascertained to be true by scientific investigation, or by the notices of our bodily senses. Propositions which are unaccompanied by testimony, are mere subjects of conjecture, and not objects of faith.

2. Whatever the eye sees, the ear hears, and whatever we taste,