Belles Lettres, 1782*. The other, written by the fuccessful competitor, has been alfo committed to the prefs, by this generous rival. There are different fpecies, as well as degrees of merit; and though numbers may contend, the prize can only be adjudged to one. But as thefe difcourfes are thus published together, they naturally challenge a comparative view of their refpective excellencies. Our contracted limits render it impoffible for us to do juftice to either; but we will endeavour to give fuch a view of each, as fhall enable the judicious reader to appreciate their different merits.

To follow the order of the publication, we fhall commence with the difcourfe of M. DE MEERMAN.

The question itself confifts of three branches. It specifies the form of government to which the grand object of the inquiry is confined; the fpirit which it wishes to excite; and the molt efficacious means by which that fpirit may be excited. Accordingly the author makes fome previous inquiries concerning the two preceding articles, which form the bafis of the laft. He obferves, that the monarchy here referred to, and which is to be kept inviolate, neceffarily excludes a despotic government: in which it is impoffible for a fpirit of patriotifm to exift, in which the ideas of mafter and flave take place of fovereign and fubject; under which, though the vaffal may, like the favage, have a peculiar attachment to his natal foil, prefer the climate, the products, and the manners adopted from his infancy, yet as he is liable to be ftript in a moment of every thing that is dear and valuable to him, by the arbitrary mandate of his ruler, he hath, properly fpeaking, no country that he can call his own. He is merely an ufufructuary, dependent on the capricious bounty of a proprietor. The monarchy therefore, to which the question refers, muft imply fuch a flate in which, though the fupreme authority be vefted in the hands of an individual, yet it is exercited according to certain established laws where property is fecure from violence, and where newber life nor liberty can be attacked without fome fuppofed offence having been committed, of which legitimate judges are the only arbitrators. Notwithstanding his predilection for the republi can form, the author acknowleges that a fpirit of patriotifm may fubfift under a monarchy; and that fome confiderable advantages attend this mode of government. After having made fome juft and obvious remarks of this kind, in which he mani fefts a warm and genuine love of liberty, M. DE MEERMAN proceeds to enquire into the fecond previous article, What is the nature of patriotism in a monarchy? He anfwers, When we love our country, the firit, the most valuable of all duties, is to pre

See Appendix to Review, vol. 1xxi. p. 531.

ferve its conftitution inviolated; and protect it, as much as it lies in our power, from every change. This is the bafis of every fpecies of patriotism, in monarchies, as well as in republics.' This doctrine will not be relished by thofe of the author's countrymen who have affumed the name of patriots in the late troubles in the United Provinces; of whom there were, doubtlefs, numbers who thought that they were demonftrating the love of their country, by their ftrenuous endeavours to reform fome of the radical defects of their conftitution. Indeed the axiom, ftrictly adhered to, neceffarily preclades every fpecies of reform. It either fuppofes perfection in the first instance, which is an impoffibility; or it obliges the governed, notwithftanding the jufter notions of the ends and objects of government, which are now univerfally diffused, to fit down contented with all the legal defects which ancient ignorance and prejudices, or incapacity, had blended with the conftitutions as they were forming; and it is diametrically oppofite to that noble fpirit of patriotifm, which promifes fo defirable a change in the French government, of which M. DE M. will be one of the warmest admirers. But it is to be prefumed, that the dif orders occafioned in the Dutch republic by these recent attempts to reform, and the cruelties and oppreffions committed by the ufurpers of power, under the facred name of liberty and public good, have betrayed the author into this fentiment. It will be readily granted, that there is often much lefs danger in fuffering the evils that may have crept into a conftitution, with the fame patience which we fhew amid the other inevitable evils of life, than in attempting a remedy.' But is not the limitation too confined, when he afferts, that the only cafe which authorifes a change in the conftitution, on the fide of the people, is when the people return to their primitive ftate, on the extinction of the family on the throne: when a new choice is made, and the crown is transferred to a ftranger, they are then at liberty to propofe new conditions.' Surely, when the monarch degenerates into a defpot, the mutual compact is broken; and the people, in their struggles for liberty, have a right to extend their privileges. By thefe means, principally, the British conftitution bas advanced to its prefent envied ftate: the greateft tyrants have become the most efficacious inftruments of public freedom.

M. DE MEERMAN next proceeds to the immediate object of the queftion, Which are the best methods to excite and encourage patriotism in a monarchy? &c. He obferves, that four motives influence men to good and great actions: Tafte, Senfe of Duty, Intereft, and Honour. Hence arife four general rules applicable to the fubject: 1. Take care that the fubjects of a monarchy acquire a taste for patriotifm. 2. Give them juft ideas of their duty in general, and of their duty in particular. 3. Let pa

triotic

triotic actions be recompenfed. 4. Let patriotifm be rendered refpectable. The firft end is beft obtained by the exemplary conduct of the Sovereign. By this will the fubject become fully perfuaded of his genuine affection for their common country, and be eafily induced to imitate his example. The fecond end will be obtained by the cultivation of a religious difpofition, and diffufing the knowlege and practice of virtue through the means of private education, and every fpecies of public inftruction. M. DE M. imagines that if the government were to recompenfe, in fome fignal manner, thofe who had moft diftinguithed themselves by cultivating the principles of found morality, and if treatifes on the practice of religion and virtue were circulated at the public expence, among the lower orders of citizens, the most happy effects would be the refult. He wishes alfo that patriotic focieties would annually propofe questions relative to fubjects of this nature; and that minifters, mafters of families, and parents, who had been moft fuccessful in forming the mind to virtue, fhould receive fome public mark of general approbation. The public prefs, and a proper regulation of the theatre, might also be made fubfervient to the fame defirable end. The application of the two other means of exciting a spirit of patriotifm, muft be directed by various circumstances of feafon, locality, national manners, &c. The proper choice of minifters and confidants, and the diftribution of penfions and titles, are fo many inftruments in the hands of a wife and virtuous fovereign, by which fubjects may be made emulous of each other in the practice of patriotic virtues. Bufts, ftatues, monuments, infcriptions, medals, funerals at the public expence, and funeral orations pronounced by felect orators, are means powerful in themfelves; and, if judiciously employed, they cannot fail to enflame the moft frigid heart, and infufe the enthusiasm of a public fpirit into every bofom.

Such are the meafures which M. DE MEERMAN propofes; and on which he enlarges with much good fenfe, perfpicuity, and, fometimes, with a degree of animation; and fuch is the advice which our patriotic republican gives to fovereigns. But what if fovereigns will not attend to it? In this cafe, he acknowleges that little good is to be expected. The sphere of action for individuals and fmaller communities is too contracted; yet, he exhorts thefe communities to exert themselves in their narrow circles, by example, precept, and encouragement, in order to awaken a general fpirit of patriotifm. Again, fuppofe the fovereign, inftead of being fupine and negligent, fhould ftep over the legal boundaries of his power? Patriotifm is not encouraged and promoted by exciting the oppreffed to revolt. They ought to be inftructed in their duty and their rights, and perfuaded to pour their complaints into the bofoms of their

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legal

legal reprefentatives.' If thefe prove ineffectual, our author bas no further remedies to propofe.

Monf. MATHON DE LA COUR, the fuccefsful candidate, propofes, as the plan of his difcourfe, to examine what are the fentiments or principles in the human mind which difpofe to patriot fm, or which conftitute its effence: to investigate their nature and their effects in republics and monarchies, in larger and fmaller ftates, in ancient and modern times; and then to point out the means of exciting and encouraging patriotism in inonarchies. He introduces the firft inquiry, by fome very ingenious and pertinent remarks concerning thofe two fprings of action implanted in human nature, felf-love, and social; and he expatiates, in a pleafing manner, on the effects produced in the world by the different modifications of these two fources of every virtue, and of every vice, by the union or oppofitions of their influence.

According as the one or the other predominates, we behold characters appear on the stage of the universe. Selfish, frigid, and fevere, or fouls formed for fenfibility and love, ever forgetful of their own intereft, ready to facrifice themfelves for the beloved object. Unfortunately, the one is much more common than the other. Self-love indicates itself from the cradle, and never quits us till death. The love of our neighbour, that elevated and virtuous fentiment, which extends our affections, prompts us to cherish others, and to exist as it were in the objects of our love, is, doubtless, one of the noblet prefents that the Deity has ever made to mortals; but it fhines with luftre in privileged minds alone. The contracted foul contemplates its own advantage merely in the welfare of the country, or of humanity at large; difinterestedness, with fuch, is a romantic virtue; the felf dedication of heroifm, is madness; the facrifices of love and friendship, are vain deceits, or interested and perfidious artifices. But in great and noble minds, the fame active principle of benevolence which constitutes the good parent, the fincere and curdial friend, rifing and fwelling above the objects immediately furrounding it, overflows the bounds of common affections, and conftitutes the genuine patriot, and the benefactor of his fpecies.'

This fpirit of patriotifm is carefully diftinguished from that amor patria which is common to every native. The one is a natural propenfity, the other is a virtue. Patriotism may be connected with the more common principle, but is it the perfection of it?' After expatiating largely on this fubject with a precifion which does honour to his head, and a warmth and enthufiaim which reflect luftre on his heart, he proceeds to the queftion, whether a republican, or a monarchical form of government, be beft calculated to promote and cherish this noble and fublime principle. Here he takes a different road from M. DE MEERMAN. While the latter fimply acknowleges that patriotifm may poffibly fubfift in monarchies, M. DE LA COUR contends that monarchies are the most favourable to its growth.

He

He maintains that patriotifm in a republic, is more immediately united with perfonal advantages; and, confequently, it cannot be fo difinterested; and the warm profesions of it are much more fufpicious. His train of reafoning on this queftion is ingenious, and merits attention; but it is too long for infertion, and would fuffer too much by an abridgment, He also maintains that ancient times were much more favourable to patriotifm, than the modern; and alleges feveral reafons wherefore examples of genuine patriotifm were more frequently to be met with in the earlier periods of hiftory. Navigation was in its infancy; commerce was contracted; nations, being at perpetual war, inftead of having any focial intercourfe, were fanning the flame of hatred and revenge; prifoners of war being reduced to the most abject flavery. All thefe caufes confpired to increafe that natural attachment to the native foil, and render patriotifm a virtue of frequent neceffity. Whereas the improved ftate of navigation, the extent of commerce, the invention of printing, and every cause which contributes to the progress of civilization, removes local prejudices, enfeebles this national predilection, and induces men to confider themfelves more as citizens of the world.

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M. DE LA COUR next propofes the methods of exciting this laudable spirit of patriotim in a monarchy, which he digefts under the following heads: Difpofe the minds, and regulate the morals of the public in a manner favourable to patriotism; remove every embarrassment and obftruction to its advancement; and employ the moft efficacious means to render it flourishing. The first object is anfwered by rendering their country dear to them. Men, in order to poffefs a genuine love of their country, muft te happy in it. The good of the community, which ought to be the only object of every adminiftration, may therefore be confidered as one bafis of patriotifm.' Encourage religion and morality; fupprefs odious and burthenfome taxes: where evils are not to be remedied, Sovereigns, fhew that thefe afflict you, and your people will be confoled. Love them, let their intereft engage your attention, and your good withes will call forth their benedictions, and acclamations of love and joy. Difcourage the luxury of the great, which depopulates the provinces, increafes pride and fervility, and threatens to annibilate the middle clafs of citizens. Diminish the number of penal laws, and multiply thofe honours and rewards which excite emulation. The hiftory of governments tells us perpetually of authority, punishments, reftrictions, and threats. Are thefe all which a father owes to his children, a fovereign to his people? Diftribute your benefits through every part of your empire with an equal hand. You enjoy the fervices of each; taxes are levied from every part; let not your favours then be contined to thofe who furround the throne.' Among other methods

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