ART. XXI.

FOREIGN LITERATURE.

ART. I.

Questions à examiner avant l'Assemblée des Etats Généraux, &c. i. e. Queftions to be examined before the Meeting of the States General. By the Marquis DE CASAUX. 8vo. Pamph. Paris. 1788.

THE

HE Marquis de Cafaux here endeavours to impress the people of France with thofe ideas concerning civil liberty and political regulations, which he had previously endeavoured to propagate in England, in the work entitled, Obfervations on the Mechanifm of Societies, and the explanatory pamphlets that followed it; of which we have repeatedly fpoken in our late Reviews. The principles here inculcated, are exactly the fame with thofe that were developed in that larger work; and his mode of illuftrating these principles differs not from that which he there adopted. But if we had occafion to remark that this mode of illuftration was fuch, as that few in our country, where fpeculations of this nature are more familiar than in any other nation, could follow him,-we are afraid that in France, where the minds of the people in general have not been accuftomed to deep inquiries into the fecret tendency of political regulations, they will be ftill lefs understood; fo that if the Marquis's doctrines were, by the bulk of the people here, reckoned no better than ingenious paradoxes, we fufpect that in France they may be in general regarded only as political reveries. We with the ingenious author could have taken the trouble to clothe his doctrines in a dress that would have been more fuited to the general state of knowlege at this time: for, although there may be exceptions, yet we are fatisfied that the fundamental part of this author's doctrines reft on truth and nature.

The queftions which he proposes for difcuffion are as follow:

Qu. I. Of the mechanical effects of the price of labour on the revenue from land.

II. Of the mechanical effects of that part of the impoft paid by the clafs of labourers who cultivate the foil.

III. Of the effects mechanically produced on the revenue from land, by that portion of the territorial impoft paid by the proprietor, or by the farmer.

IV. Of the effects mechanically produced on the general mafs of revenue from induftry, by the price fixed for the day's labour of the artisan, and by the portion of the impoft that is paid by

him.

V. Of the effects of the privilege, accounted fo valuable, to fcreen a perfon from impofts, produced mechanically on the mafs

of

of the revenue of those who throw on the nonprivileged the portion of the impoft which the privileged ought in justice to pay.

VI. Of the mechanical effects of a national bankruptcy.

VII. Of the mechanical effects of a national debt, confolidated by impofts which fecure the intereft of it.

VIII. Of the probable effects of the fimple difcuffions offered concerning the feven preceding questions.

IX. Of the mechanical effects of giving the freeft play to the moft oppofite interefts.

Those readers who are acquainted with our author's former writings, will readily fee, from the mere ftatement of the foregoing queftions, what will be the refult of his difquifitions. In general, he endeavours to prove that whatever tends to diminish, in any way, the income of the lower claffes of people, diminishes the general mass of revenue in a high degree; and that in particular, refpecting the fifth question.

The privilege of which it is fuppofed the two firft orders of the ftate [the clergy and the nobleffe] are fo jealous, [that of being exempted from taxes] reduces itself to the abfurd right, of detracting annually from the value of their lands, to the extent of three times the amount of that part of the tax from which they think themselves exempted by their privileges.'

We doubt if it will be an eafy matter to convince these two powerful bodies of the certainty of this momentous truth; or to induce them voluntarily to relinquish this facred privilege; though we have been lately amufed with fome hints that this measure will be adopted.

We have often had occafion to commend the liberal fpirit, and the humane principles, that run through all this author's writings. In almost every page, we meet with maxims, which, however oppofite to thofe that have prevailed, in fome nations, for ages paft, will, we doubt not, be revered as facred truths in future times. Of this nature, we confider the following rule, which, though not new, nor exclusively belonging to the Marquis, cannot be too often repeated:

In what then (fays he) confifts the protection neceffary to be given to agriculture? To do nothing to augment, to do nothing to diminish, the number of cultivators.'

The fame rule will apply to every other clafs of citizens. Sincerely do we wish that this maxim were fully adopted in Great Britain! How many idle difputes would it prevent-how many ridiculous laws would it abolish-how much general happiness would it produce!

As a fpecimen of this pamphlet, we quote the following paffage, which occurs in difcuffing the ninth queftion:

Let us fee what would refult from a new order of things, where all fhould go on of itself, not pushed by administration, nor kept back

back but by another intereft as free and as active; nor repreffed by any thing else than the laws, without exception.

Every man in fociety would wish to promote,

1ft, His own perfonal intereft;

2d, That of his family;

3d, That of the body of which he is a member, or, if you will,

of his corporation;

4th, That of his district;

5th, The public intereft.

Such is the order of nature; and whoever departs from it is a prodigy of heroifm or of imbecility; and nothing is more useless than to argue concerning prodigies.

In the mean time, fuppofe a certain number of individuals,-of families,-of corporations,-of diftricts, in what country, and under what form of government you please, provided that administration, Somewhat enlightened, allows to each intereft of individuals, of families, of corporations, and of diftricts, all the means and power to display its energy in every respect, I ask, what could all these interests do in preffing with an equal force? Nothing, bat keep themselves in equilibrium. Let us rather afk, would there not neceffarily refult from this mutual preffure, from this reciprocal action of one on the others, an edifice almost as perfect, though directed by human reafon, as that admirable edifice which we call a hive; wholly erected, as it is, by instinct, under the immediate infpection of the Divinity? And will not the public interest, obviously the only one that can act freely when all the others watch over and balance each other, neceffarily triumph in every public deliberation, where every thing fhall be freely dif

cuffed?'

The following reflections on the nature of the English conftitution will probably arreft the attention of our readers.

Neither the abilities nor the integrity of the English Minifters can infure for ever the profperity of England, feeing that, like all other countries, that nation has had many Minifters of very ordinary talents, and fome far from being immaculate.

It is not the perpetual exiflence of an open, fearlefs, decided oppofition, whofe intereft it is to difpute every thing with the Minifter; feeing that it is poffible that the Minifter and the oppofition may find it their mutual intereft to unite * and feeing that there might refult from fuch a coalition, both the oppreffion of the people, and the flavery of the prince; which always follows, very quickly, the oppreffion of the people :

It is not the freedom of voting at elections for members of parliament; feeing that a great majority of thefe electors, without talents or information, neither know, nor can know, either the character or the capacity of the candidates; and, confequently, it is abfurd to fuppofe a true liberty with this want of knowlege:

It is not the freedom of fpeech in both Houses of Parliament;— feeing that a great majority in the one House as well as the

We omit a few fentences which do not materially affect the ar

gument.

other,

other, is always for the Minifter, till the inftant which precedes a change of miniftry; though it is contrary to nature that the Minister fhould never be mistaken :

It is not the diftinction and the refpective independence of the Commons, of the Peers, and of the King, joined to the neceffity of their agreeing before any law whatever can be enacted :

No; it is not to thefe means (fo much extolled!) that England owes that aftonishing profperity, that enviable wealth, that power, ftill capable of defending all its rights. It is to that fword of Damocles, which is every where in England fufpended over the head of whoever should meditate even in fecret, any project hurtful to the Prince or the people; it is to this principle, deeply impreffed on the mind of every Englishman, that the head of no one man is capable of comprehending every thing; that the best ideas are only those which refult from a combination of the joint lights of the whole :

• Deprive England of the only means of preferving this principle in its full energy; take from it the freedom of the prefs; a freedom, which every Minifter in England, as well as every where else, wishes to annihilate during his own adminiftration, and to fubftitute in its place an abfolute order to adore his very overfights and errors; take away, I fay, from England, the freedom of the prefs, and in fpite of all the refources of its admirable conftitution, ministerial blunders, so rare in England, would fucceed each other with as great rapidity as elsewhere; they would even pafs with more tranquillity than elfewhere; at first, minifterial overfights, and afterward their more daring and destructive enterprises; becaufe the people would rest satisfied under the fhadow of an oppofition which would not fail fecretly to demand, and in the fame manner would obtain a divifion of the Spoils of the prince and of the people; and quickly that most flourishing nation would only be an object of pity to all those whose envy it now excites, and whofe admiration it deferves.

On the other hand, transfer by degrees to Turkey, the freedom of the prefs; invent, for it does not exift, invent a means by which the fruits of it fhould reach the Grand Signior by any other hands than that of a vifir, who could fo easily corrupt every thing, and very foon no vifir would dare to deceive his mafter; every vifir would then confult the voice of the people before he thundered forth his own orders; and immediately Turkey, rich in the natural products of its own territory and its immenfe population, will be more powerful, and not lefs refpected than England, now fo powerful, and fo much respected.'

This praise bestowed on the beneficial effects of the freedom of the prefs, is doubtless very juft.-But where is the conftitution, except that of Great Britain, which could infure the freedom of the prefs? It is to the nature of our constitution alone that we owe this bleffing as well as many others.

In a poftfcript to this publication, the author throws a confiderable degree of light on the ancient conftitution of France, with regard to the mode of convoking the States General; which deferves the ferious attention of that nation at the preREV. March, 1789.

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fent

fent moment, and will not prove uninterefting to fuch Englith readers as may be particularly attentive to the important fubjects at this time agitated in that country. We fincerely with this ftruggle for freedom may be conducted with wisdom and moderation, and finally crowned with fuccefs; though it is fcarcely to be expected that complete fuccefs fhould take place at the firft effort. An-..n.

ART. II.

Mémoires du Baron DE LA MOTTE FOUQUE', &c. i. e. Memoirs of the Baron DE LA MOTTE FOUQUE', General of the Pruffian Infantry; including his Correfpondence with Frederic II. King of Pruffia. 8vo. 2 Vols. Berlin. 1788.

Thefe Memoirs are written (and are faid to be published with the approbation of the prefent Baron) by Monf. G. A. BUTTNER; who feems to have owed his fortunes to the General's protection, and who was his intimate companion during the latter part of his life.

The late General, who was defcended from one of the most ancient and illuftrious families in Normandy, was born in 1698, at the Hague; whither his father, who was a Proteftant, had fled from the perfecution which followed the infamous revocation of the Edict of Nantes. In 1715, when Leopold Duke of Anhalt Deffau was appointed to command the Pruffian army at Stralfund, againft Charles XII. our hero, who was then a page in that court, was ordered to remain with the Duchefs. His inclination for the fervice prompted him to entreat permiffion to accompany the army; but not obtaining this, he refolved to leave the court fecretly, and to enter as a private foldier in the Duke's regiment, which was then at Halle. In 1725 he was honoured with the notice of Frederic William, and with the friendship of the late King, which continued during the whole of his life; this intimacy was not discountenanced by the old monarch, who allowed M. de FoUQUE' to be the prince's companion in his prison at Cuftrin: he had also the honour to accompany Frederic in his retreat at Rheinfberg, where he was made Grand Mafter of an order of knighthood, which the princes and their companions had inftituted among themfelves, on the principles of the celebrated BAYARD. The emblem of the Order, was a fword lying on a crown of laurel, and the motto, Sans peur, et fans reproche. On account of fome difagreement with his Colonel, the Prince of Anhalt, in 1739, our hero quitted the Pruffian, and entered into the Danish, fervice; but was recalled by Frederic II. immediately after his acceffion to the throne. A great part of the correfpondence between the King and General FOUQUE', relates to the military operations in the wars of 1748 and 1756. Of the Baron's profeffional merit, we cannot pre

fume